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CONSOLIDATION AND INNOVATION
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE
CURRENT INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM
JOANNA SHEPHERD1
Recent changes in the pharmaceutical industry have spurred an
unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions. Some researchers and
agencies have questioned whether pharmaceutical consolidation could impede
drug innovation. However, as I explain in this Article, these concerns are largely
based on an outdated understanding of the drug innovation ecosystem. Whereas
a few decades ago almost all drug discovery took place inside traditional
pharmaceutical companies, today most drug innovation is externally-sourced
from biotech companies and smaller firms. Internal R&D is no longer the
primary source, or even an important source, of drug innovation. As a result,
analyses that focus on the impacts of pharmaceutical consolidation on internal
drug innovation are incomplete and missing the point. Instead, merger analyses
should examine whether consolidation increases demand for externally-sourced
innovation and, ultimately, strengthens aggregate drug innovation.
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant changes in recent
decades. Intensifying competition from generics, expanding power of
pharmaceutical payors, increasing costs of drug development, and growing risks
of commercial failure have increasingly strained drug makers’ finances. Many
firms have responded by consolidating to either reduce costs or create new
sources of revenue. As a result, the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
in the pharmaceutical industry has recently hit an all-time high. The total value
of pharmaceutical M&A deals reached its highest point ever in 2015, and annual
deal value is consistently at least double the deal value from a decade ago.
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The increasing pharmaceutical M&A activity has produced a
corresponding level of concern about the impacts of consolidation on the
industry. While mergers are typically and understandably scrutinized for harm to
competition, researchers and regulatory agencies occasionally raise lesstraditional concerns about harm to innovation. These concerns are premised on
the idea that, by merging existing competitors into one firm, consolidation will
reduce incentives to develop new products in the future. These concerns have
been expressed in several recent academic studies that find a negative
relationship between pharmaceutical consolidation and innovation activities
within the newly-consolidated firm. In a similar vein, both U.S. and European
lawmakers are currently scrutinizing proposed mergers in the agricultural
industry— between Monsanto and Bayer and Dow and Dupont—in part based
on innovation concerns.
However, concerns about the impact of consolidation on drug innovation
are largely based on an outdated understanding of the innovation ecosystem in
the pharmaceutical industry. Today, most drug innovation originates not in
traditional pharmaceutical companies, but in biotech companies and smaller
firms, where a culture of nimble decision-making and risk-taking facilitates
discovery and innovation. In the later stages of the drug development process,
the biotech companies routinely partner with large pharmaceutical companies to
advance through expensive late-stage clinical trials and to effectively
manufacture, market, and distribute the drugs. In this current ecosystem, biotech
and pharmaceutical firms are each able to specialize in what they do best,
bringing expertise and efficiencies to the innovation process. The specialization
has led to an environment in which approximately three-fourths of new drugs are
externally-sourced. Internal R&D is no longer the primary source, or even an
important source, of drug innovation in large pharmaceutical companies.
As a result, analyses that focus on mergers’ impacts on internal R&D and
innovation are missing the point. Instead, proper analyses of the impacts of
consolidation on innovation should focus on whether consolidation enables firms
to better support aggregate drug innovation in the current ecosystem. Concerns
about harm to innovation could be relevant in specific mergers or acquisitions if
the consolidating firms are the primary innovators in the area, the firms innovate
internally, and there are essentially no sources of external innovation. However,
such scenarios are increasingly rare in the current ecosystem. As long as there is
sufficient market competition so that firms must innovate to ensure their future
profitability and market share, consolidation will often allow firms to devote
more resources to externally-sourced innovation. The increased demand for
externally-sourced innovation will, in turn, spur incentives to innovate in biotech
and small companies. Indeed, data suggests that consolidation is associated with
increases in aggregate innovation. In recent years, aggregate innovation has held
strong notwithstanding dramatic increases in M&A activity; in fact, 2014 and
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2015 generated both record numbers of new drug approvals and record
pharmaceutical M&A.
Therefore, merger analyses that focus on the impact of consolidation on
internal innovation are incomplete because they fail to recognize that
consolidation can increase demand for externally-sourced innovation and,
ultimately, strengthen aggregate drug innovation. This Article proceeds as
follows. In Section II, I describe the forces that have dramatically changed the
pharmaceutical industry’s economic environment and driven many firms to
consolidate. I also explain the concerns, raised by both researchers and regulatory
agencies, about consolidation’s potential harm to innovation. In Section III, I
explain the current drug innovation ecosystem, detailing the strengths of both
traditional pharmaceutical companies and smaller, biotech firms in drug
discovery. In Section IV, I argue that proper analyses of mergers must focus not
on the impacts to internal R&D, but on the impacts to externally-sourced R&D
and aggregate drug innovation. I conclude in Section V.
I.

CONSLIDATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Mergers and acquisitions play an important role in pharmaceutical
companies’ efforts to improve efficiency and add new markets, innovative drugs,
and novel technologies. Pharmaceutical M&A has recently hit an all-time high.
In 2015, 236 biopharma M&A deals were closed worldwide, with a combined
value of over $403 billion, a new record for the industry.2 Although 2016 saw a
decrease in combined deal value,3 M&A activity is still up substantially; the
annual deal value is now consistently more than twice the average annual deal
value in the decade prior to 2014.4 Moreover, many commentators predict a
pharmaceutical merger boom in the next few years as the Republican control of
government brings a more positive outlook for the industry.5

2. DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL LIFE SCIENCES OUTLOOK: THRIVING IN TODAY’S UNCERTAIN MARKET
20 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Life-Sciences-HealthCare/gx-lshc-2017-life-sciences-outlook.pdf; Joanne Finnegan, 2015 Was a Record Breaker for M&A in
Pharma, Medical and Biotech with Deals Worth $575 Billion, BIOSPACE (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://www.biospace.com/News/2015-was-a-record-breaker-for-ma-in-pharma-medical/405749.
3. MERGERMARKET, PHARMA, MEDICAL, & BIOTECH TREND REPORT: Q1-Q4 2016 2 (2017),
http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/MergermarketTrendReport.Q1Q42016.Pharma,Medical,Biotech.pdf.
4. ERNST AND YOUNG, EY M&A OUTLOOK AND FIREPOWER REPORT 2017 3-4 (2017),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-ma-outlook-and-firepower-report-2017/$FILE/ey-maoutlook-and-firepower-report-2017.pdf.; IMAP, GLOBAL M&A REPORT: PHARMA/BIOTECH 2016 4
(2016), http://www.imap.com/Reports/Global%20Pharma%20Biotech%20MA%20Report%202016.pdf.
5. Reuters, Donald Trump’s Presidency Could Unleash a Pharma Merger Boom, FORTUNE (Nov.
11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/11/donald-trump-pharma-merger-boom/.
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A. Factors Driving Consolidation

Pharmaceutical consolidation has largely been the response to industrywide shocks that have dramatically changed the landscape of the industry over
the last few decades. The aggregate impact of these shocks, discussed in more
detail below, has been to squeeze pharmaceutical firms’ revenues while
increasing their costs. As the shocks have increasingly put firms under economic
stress, many have responded by consolidating to either reduce costs or create
new sources of revenue.
Many firms have entered into M&A deals as a defensive strategy to offset
losses in market share and achieve cost savings.6 Evidence has shown that
consolidation has enabled many merging firms to streamline operations and
eliminate excess capacity resulting from rapidly changing industry conditions.7
Others have merged hoping to increase revenues by strengthening existing
product portfolios, filling pipeline gaps, entering new therapeutic categories or
markets, or acquiring innovative technologies.8 Indeed, empirical studies show
that firms with an aging portfolio of patented drugs are more likely to merge in
order to improve future revenue prospects.9
Since the early 1980s, the economic environment facing pharmaceutical
companies has changed dramatically, with intensifying competition from
generics, expanding power from PBMs, increasing costs of R&D, and growing
risk of commercial failure. These changes brought increasing pressure on
pharmaceutical firms to lower prices even though, at the same time, many of the
firms’ costs were increasing.10 The following discussion briefly explains these
changes.
1. Intensifying Generic Competition
First, the nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry has changed
dramatically as brand companies have lost significant market share to generics.
The generic industry exploded after the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 created an
6. Henry Grabowski, The Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry Over the Past 50 Years:
A Personal Reflection, 18 INT’L. J. OF THE ECON. OF BUS. 161, 173 (2011).
7. David J. Ravenscraft & William F. Long, Paths to Creating Value in Pharmaceutical Mergers,
in MERGERS AND PRODUCTIVITY 287, 322 (Steven N. Kaplan ed., 2000).
8. Henry Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Mergers and Alliances in Pharmaceuticals: Effects On
Innovation and R&D Productivity, in THE ECON. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND MERGERS 262, 268–69
(Klaus Gugler & B. Bursin Yurtoglu eds., 2008).
9. Matthew. J. Higgins & Daniel Rodriguez, The Outsourcing of R&D Through Acquisition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 352 (2006); see Patricia M. Danzon ET AL., Mergers and
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 307,
325 (2007) (explaining study findings that mergers among large firms are often in response to excess
capacity due to anticipated patent expirations and gaps in a company’s product pipeline).
10. A similar, but more in-depth discussion of these changes can be found in: Joanna Shepherd, The
Prescription for Rising Drug Prices: Competition or Price Controls?, HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L. MED.
(2017),https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1609&context=healthmatrix.
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abbreviated regulatory process that encouraged companies to produce and
market cheaper, generic drugs.11 Generics have been further aided by drug
substitution laws in every state that allow, or even require, pharmacists to
automatically substitute a generic-equivalent drug when a patient presents a
prescription for a brand drug.12 These regulatory changes have allowed generics
to capture significant market share from brand companies. Whereas generics
comprised only 19 percent of all drugs dispensed prior to 1984, they now
represent over 88 percent of prescriptions filled. 13
The success of generic drugs can be attributed entirely to their lower prices.
When a brand drug’s patent expires, generics initially enter the market at a price
that is, on average, 50 percent less than their brand counterpart.14 As the months
11. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984);
U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED
PRICES
AND
RETURNS
IN
THE
PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY,
ix
(1998),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf. To spur the
introduction of low-cost generics, Hatch-Waxman created the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) process that allows a generic that demonstrates bioequivalence to rely on previously submitted
brand-name safety and efficacy data. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2017); Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA):
Generics,
FDA
(last
updated
Feb.
27,
2007),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Appro
valApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/. This greatly truncated process
enables generic manufacturers to quickly enter the market after the brand drug’s patent expires. Moreover,
Hatch-Waxman actively incentivizes generic companies to challenge brand patents’ validity by creating
a pathway for such challenges and by offering a lucrative incentive to the first generic manufacturer that
files an ANDA claiming that the brand patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by the new generic.
See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG
EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, & COSMETIC
ACT 1-2 (1998), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/. . ./Guidances/ucm079342.pdf. If the generic
company wins or settles the patent litigation, it receives a 180-day exclusivity period during which the
FDA will not approve any other generic versions of the drug, a period in which the first generic can earn
substantial profits by shadow pricing the innovator’s price. Id.
12. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FTC, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION 155 (1979).
12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC
DRUG USE 2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf; IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE
OF
MEDICINES
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
IN
2012
15
(May
2013),
http://static.correofarmaceutico.com/docs/2013/05/20/usareport.pdf;
PHRMA,
CHARTPACK:
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS
IN
PERSPECTIVE
56
(2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC
DRUG USE 2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf; IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE
MEDICINES
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
IN
2012
15
(May
2013),
OF
http://static.correofarmaceutico.com/docs/2013/05/20/usareport.pdf;
PHRMA,
CHARTPACK:
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS
IN
PERSPECTIVE
56
(Spring
2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf.
14. MS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER BRANDED MEDICINES
LOSE
EXCLUSIVITY
IN
THE
U.S.
2–3
(2016),
https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%20Institute/Healthcare%20Briefs/PhRMA%20Generic%2
0Price%20Brief%20January%202016.pdf.
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pass and more generics enter the market, the generic price eventually drops to 80
percent off the pre-expiry brand drug’s price. Generic companies are able to
charge these lower prices while earning substantial profits because they face
significantly lower development and marketing costs than brand drug companies.
In contrast to brand companies that spend an average of $2.6 billion on R&D and
the FDA approval process, bringing a new generic drug to market costs only $1
to $2 million.15 In addition, whereas brand companies spend millions of dollars
marketing their drugs to physicians and patients,16 generic companies typically
spend very little on marketing, instead relying on automatic substitution laws for
the vast majority of their sales. With these significantly lower costs, generic
companies can afford to charge a lower price for their drugs and still earn
impressive profits.
The lower prices induce many brand drug customers to switch to the lowerpriced generics as they enter the market, swiftly eroding brand drugs’ market
share. Upon market entry, generics now routinely capture over 70 percent of the
brand drug’s market share within only 3 months of generic entry, and over 80
percent within 12 months.17 This swift erosion of market share means that many
brand pharmaceutical firms experience dramatic decreases in revenue after they
reach the “patent cliff” and generics enter the market. An early study by the U.S.
Congressional Budget Office found that during the first decade after the HatchWaxman Act, total net revenues generated by new drugs declined by 12 percent
as a result of generic entry.18 Between 2012 and 2018, it is estimated that
pharmaceutical companies will lose almost $150 billion in revenues because of
generic entry after patent expirations.19

15. 15.CHARTPACK: BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 13, at 36; OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING
THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 4-5 (Dec. 1, 2010), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76151/ib.pdf;
Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Industries, 8 GEORGETOWN PUB. POLICY REV. 7, 13 (2003) (noting that “[g]eneric firms can file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a process that takes only a few years and typically costs a
few million dollars.
16. Brand companies spent between $103 million and $249 million on the top-10 most heavily
advertised drugs in 2014 alone. See Beth Snyder Bulik, The Top-10 Most Advertised Prescription Drug
Brands, FIERCEPHARMA (2015), http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-10-most-advertisedprescription-drug-brands (last accessed Mar. 27, 2017).
17. See
PHRMA,
CHARTPACK:
PHARMACEUTICALS
IN
PERSP.
57
(2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf (showing that the average lifetime
revenue for drugs introduced between 1991 and 2005 rose from $3.4 billion to $5.1 billion, then fell to
$2.9 billion for drugs introduced between 2005 and 2009).
18. U .S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR
MEDICARE 38 (2002).
19. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FROM VISION TO DECISION: PHARMA 2020, 6 (2012),
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pharma-life-sciences/pharma2020/assets/pwc-pharma-success-strategies.pdf.
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2. Expanding Power of Pharmacy Benefit Managers
Second, brand companies have also faced increased power from
pharmaceutical “payors.” Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which administer
the prescription drug coverage for over 95 percent of insured Americans, 20 have
adopted various benefit changes and tools to reduce pharmaceutical prices and
steer patients to less-expensive alternatives.21 For example, PBMs have
successfully reduced drug spending by requiring substitution of generic drugs for
brand name drugs when clinically appropriate.22 PBMs also employ tiered
formularies—a list of approved or preferred drugs for the health plan—and steer
consumers to the formulary drugs with incentives such as lower copayments.
Because formulary status can greatly influence the sales of a drug, PBMs are able
to negotiate significant discounts from brand drug manufacturers in exchange for
a formulary listing.23
These and other innovative tools have saved Americans billions of dollars
each year.24 However, they have also dramatically changed the landscape of the
pharmaceutical market by lessening drug companies’ influence over prices. In
the 1970s, most prescription drugs were prescribed by doctors that were largely
insensitive to price, methodically filled by pharmacists, and paid for by
consumers or third-party payors that had little influence over the drug chosen or
the price paid.25 As a consequence, drug manufacturers had enormous control
over price. In contrast, the market for prescription drugs today is one in which
the PBMs and drug plans have harnessed the buying clout of millions of
consumers to negotiate discounted prescription drug prices.26 PBMs and drug
plans now largely determine what consumers pay for drugs, which pharmacies
they use, and which drugs they take.27 As a result, PBMs and drug plans have
20.Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Senator Richard L. Brown, N.D. Senate 4 (Mar. 8, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050311northdakotacomnts.pdf.
21. See Dan P. Goldman, Geoffrey F. Joyce, & Yuhui Zheng, Prescription Drug Cost Sharing:
Associations With Medication and Medical Utilization and Spending and Health, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
61, 61 (2007) (describing “mail-order pharmacies, mandatory generic substitution, coinsurance plans, and
multi-tiered formularies”).
22. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS ON
HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 4 (2003).
23. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to Greg Aghazarian, California General Assembly, 6–7 (Sept.
7, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf (stating how PBMs can substitute for generic drugs and
enter into contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers to lower costs).
24. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 38 (estimating the magnitude of PBMs’ costsavings at approximately 30 percent of total prescription drug spending).; VISANTE, PHARMACY BENEFIT
MANAGERS (PBMS): GENERATING SAVINGS FOR PLAN SPONSORS AND CONSUMERS 6 (2016) (predicting
that the PBM tools will save nearly $654 billion).
25. Grabowski, supra note 6, at 167.
26. Thomas Gryta, What is a ‘Pharmacy Benefit Manager’?, WALL STREET J. (July 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576460322664055328.html (stating how
Pharmacy Benefit Manager contracts with drug manufacturers include cost-cutting incentives).
27. Id. (explaining how Pharmacy Benefit Managers aid in drug-related decisions).
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replaced drug manufacturers in the driver’s seat when it comes to determining
prices.
In addition to influencing prices, PBMs are keeping an increasing share of
the total expenditures on pharmaceuticals. Today, brand manufacturers receive
only 39 percent of the gross national spending on drugs.28 Forty-two percent of
gross spending is captured by PBMs, health plans, and supply-chain entities,
such as pharmacies and wholesalers.29 Brand manufacturers’ share of total drug
spending has steadily declined as the buying clout of PBMs and drug plans has
increased.30
3. Increasing Costs and Risks of Product Development
Third, while facing increased competition from generics and pressure to
reduce prices from PBMs, drug companies have also experienced significant
increases in both the costs of drug development and the risks of product failures.
Since the 1962 Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the
FDA has continued to increase the requirements for new drug approvals. For
example, whereas clinical trials in the 1970s typically enrolled only 2,000
patients, trials in the 1990s regularly enrolled over 5,000 patients.31 Similarly,
the costs of recruiting patients, the length of the clinical trial period, and the
number and complexity of clinical tests used in clinical trials have increased over
time.32 These more stringent requirements, along with the more complex science
associated with specialized medications, have significantly increased the costs of
drug development and FDA approval and in turn lengthened the time to market,
driving up the cost of investment. The most current estimates indicate that it now
costs approximately $2.6 billion to develop and bring each new drug to market.33
Those costs were estimated to be only $179 million in the 1970s,34 $413 million

28. AARON VANDERVELDE AND ELEANOR BLALOCK, THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN:
GROSS DRUG EXPENDITURES REALIZED BY STAKEHOLDERS 4, BERKLEY RES. GROUP. (2017)
http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/863_Vandervelde_PhRMA-January-2017_WEBFINAL.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Grabowski, supra note 6 at 169.
32. See id. at 170 (showing the increase in costs over time); see also PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
RES. & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS BEHIND NEW MEDICINES 9 (2015) (discussing various factors and
challenges that have become more prevalent in current drug development).
33. JOSEPH A. DIMASI, in TUFTS CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, BRIEFING: COST
DEVELOPING
A
NEW
DRUG
(Nov.
18,
2014)
available
at
OF
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18,_2014..pdf (last
accessed May 2, 2017).
34. See Grabowski, supra note 6 at 170 (providing the number adjusted for inflation in
“constant 2000 dollars”).
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in the 1980s,35 and $900 million in the 1990s and early 2000s.36 In contrast, it
costs generic manufacturers only one to two million dollars to bring a drug to
market.37
Moreover, only about ten percent of brand drugs that begin clinical trials
are eventually approved by the FDA. The most recent study to track FDA
approval rates found that the approval rate varied by trial phase: phase I had a
64.5% success rate, phase II had a 32.4% success rate, phase III had a 60.1%
success rate, and the FDA approved 83.2% of applications that passed phase III.38
Ultimately, of 100 drugs that begin Phase I trials, only ten drugs will eventually
be approved.39 Thus, despite dramatic increases in research and development
(R&D) spending, drug approval rates have increased little in recent decades.40
Even after FDA approval, pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly face
patent challenges that reduce the likelihood that drugs will achieve commercial
success. Hatch-Waxman actively incentivizes generic companies to challenge
the validity of brand-name patents by creating a pathway for such challenges and
by offering a lucrative incentive to the first generic manufacturer that files a
challenge claiming that the brand patent is either invalid or will not be infringed
by the new generic (known as a Paragraph IV challenge).41 If the generic
company wins or settles the patent litigation, it receives a 180-day exclusivity
period during which the FDA will not approve any other generic versions of the
drug, a period in which the first generic can earn substantial profits.42 Paragraph

35. Id. (citing Joseph A. DiMasi ET AL., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
10 J. HEALTH ECON. 107 (1991)).
36. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003).
37. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 4–5 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/basicreport/expanding-use-generic-drugs#11.
38. Michael Hay ET AL., Clinical Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 41 (2014).( Discussing how, “Phase I trials…focus on the safety of the drug and
determine the metabolic and pharmacologic actions of drugs, side effects of increasing doses, and early
evidence of effectiveness. Phase II trials…focus on the drug’s effectiveness. Phase III verifies the drug’s
efficacy and safety with 1,000-3,000 subjects suffering from the disease…”).
39. Id.
40. See
PHRMA,
ANNUAL
MEMBERSHIP
SURVEY
4
(2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015-phrma_profile_membership_results.pdf (showing new
drug approvals have not increased at the same pace as R&D spending); See also Summary of NDA
approvals and Receipts: 1938 to the Present, FDA (last updated Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/summaryofndaapprovalsreceipts1938t
othepresent/default.htm (showing how the rising costs of R&D do not correlate to a growth in approval
ratings).
41. See Margo Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity in the U.S. in
Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition, and Patent Law, 116–117, (2013) (making note of the costs of
litigation and effects on the drug that patent challenges have).
42. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS, supra note 37, at 2. (showing how the company that wins
or settles a patent litigation case gets a 180-day exclusivity period).
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IV challenges have exploded in recent years; whereas only 9 percent of drugs
facing generic entry in 1995 were challenged, 81 percent of drugs facing generic
entry in 2012 were challenged.43 Moreover, Paragraph IV challenges are
occurring earlier in the life of brand drugs. Drugs entering the market as generics
in 1995 faced their first challenge 18.7 years after original launch.44 By
comparison, drugs entering the market as generics in 2012 saw only 6.9 years
between market launch and the first Paragraph IV challenge.45 These challenges
threaten a drug’s commercial success and cost pharmaceutical companies
significant legal fees.46
Moreover, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2012 gave generics a
new administrative venue to challenge patents, the inter partes review (IPR).47
In contrast to Hatch-Waxman litigation that occurs in federal district court, IPR
proceedings culminate in a trial before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. IPR was expected to offer a
more efficient and less costly alternative to Hatch-Waxman’s litigation pathway,
but important differences between PTAB trials and district court litigation create
significant advantages for generic patent challengers.48 The PTAB applies a
lower standard of proof for invalidity than do district courts in Hatch-Waxman
litigation.49 It is also easier to meet the standard50 of proof in a PTAB trial
because there is a more lenient claim construction standard and a substantially
limited ability to amend patent claims.51 Moreover, on appeal, PTAB decisions

43. Henry Grabowski, Genia Long, & Richard Mortimer, Recent Trends in Brand‐Name and Generic
Drug Competition, 17 J. MED ECON. 207, 211 (2014).
44. Id. at 212.
45. Id.
46. Id. (noting that for high revenue drugs, generics may be quick to initiate litigation because there
is a large potential return on investment compared to the cost of litigation).
47. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299-305 (2011)
(setting forth the ability to have an IPR instead of a trial for patent challenges).
48. See generally Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict between Hatch-Waxman
and Inter Partes Review, 6 NYU J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. & ENTM’T L. 14, 28, 33 (2016) (explaining that
brand drugs are better protected by Hatch-Waxman due in part to venue and that statutory requirements
that require IPR claims be decided within twelve to eighteen months create an environment where patent
challengers have unprecedented ability to attack patents).
49. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (holding that a clear and convincing
showing of invalidity is required to invalidate patents); 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) (establishing a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard in IPR proceedings).
50. See Cuozzo Speed Tech. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–5 (2016) (providing that the “use of
the broadest reasonable construction standard increases the possibility that the examiner will find the claim
too broad (and deny it)… a standard that district courts do not apply”).
51. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Patent Trial and Appeal Board Motion to Amend Study, at 3-4
(Apr.
30,
2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-0430%20PTAB%20MTA%20study.pdf; but see http://www.finnegan.com/files/Publication/c8ee30133e31-4358-8399-6986df1a51ba/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e6715d28-f2e8-403d-a43d6c1f79881348/15-1177%2008-16-16.pdf (granting en banc review regarding whether the PTO can require
the patent owner to bear the burden of persuasion regarding patentability of amended claims).
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in IPR proceedings are given more deference than district court decisions.52
Finally, while patent challengers in district court must establish sufficient Article
III standing, IPR proceedings do not have a standing requirement, allowing any
member of the public other than the patent owner to initiate an IPR challenge.53
These advantages for patent challengers have led to significantly different patent
invalidation rates in PTAB trials compared to rates in district court litigation. 54
Whereas patents challenged in district court are invalidated in less than 40%55 of
cases, IPRs have resulted in patent invalidations in a shocking 70% of cases. 56
The intensifying competition from generics, expanding power of PBMs,
escalating R&D costs, and increasing risk of patent challenges mean that many
new pharmaceuticals will never attain commercial success. Even for the 10
percent of drugs that receive FDA approval, only 20 percent will ever earn
enough revenue to cover the growing R&D costs. 57 Moreover, the likelihood
that a drug will become profitable has decreased over time as both the risk of
failure and the costs of development have increased.58 The average lifetime
revenues for new drugs are lower now than at any point in the last 25 years.59
These shocks have put many pharmaceutical firms under significant economic
stress, motivating consolidation as a means to streamline costs and provide new
sources of revenue.
B. Concerns about Consolidation’s Impact on Innovation
The increasing pharmaceutical M&A activity has produced a
corresponding level of concern about the impacts of consolidation on the
52. Frederick H Rein ET AL., Merck & Cie v. Gnosis: A More Deferential Standard of Review for
Inter Partes Review Decisions, 13 J. GENERIC MED. 93, 93 (2017).
53. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat et. al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 55, n.39 (2016) (citing Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni
Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining how IPR hearings do not have standing
requirements while, in comparison, trial court challenges do).
54. Cf. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT N INFLECTION
POINT? 11 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patentlitigation-study.pdf (illustrating in Figure 9 the vast difference in patent invalidation in PTAB trials in
comparison to district court trials).
55. Id. at 10 (showing how patent holders win in bench trials over 61% of the time).
56. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Trial and Appeal Board Update 10
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-6-30%20PTAB.pdf.
57. See also Hay ET AL., supra note 38 at 41 (stating that ten percent of applications obtain approval);
see also John A. Vernon ET AL., Drug Development Costs When Financial Risk Is Measured Using the
Fama‐French Three‐Factor Model, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1002, 1004 (2010) (stating that only about twenty
percent of NME brought to market earn enough revenue to cover R&D costs).
58. Ernst Berndt ET AL., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs Raises Questions about
Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 245, 250 (2015).
59. See
PHRMA,
CHARTPACK:
PHARMACEUTICALS
IN
PERSP.
44
(2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf (showing that the average lifetime
revenue for drugs introduced between 1991 and 2005 rose from $3.4 billion to $5.1 billion, then fell to
$2.9 billion for drugs introduced between 2005 and 2009).
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industry. Competition enforcers have traditionally scrutinized mergers for harms
to competition, which can harm consumers by increasing prices and restricting
product choice. However, researchers and regulatory agencies occasionally raise
less-traditional concerns about harms to innovation. These concerns are premised
on the idea that mergers may disrupt “innovation markets”, or markets that
consist “of the research and development directed to particular new or improved
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.”
60
Innovation markets exist in industries, such as pharmaceutical and high-tech
industries, that depend on rapid technological advancement and place a high
value on patented products. Inquiries into the impacts of consolidation on
innovation markets stem from the notion that, by merging existing competitors
into one firm, consolidation will reduce incentives to develop new products in
the future.61
Concerns that pharmaceutical M&A may reduce innovation have been
expressed in several recent academic studies that find a negative relationship
between consolidation and “innovation activities” within the newly-consolidated
firm. Various studies have found that pharmaceutical mergers have led to lower
R&D expenditures in the consolidated firm, as compared to the expenditure in
both companies beforehand or to the expenditure in other non-merging
companies.62 Similarly, studies have found that consolidation leads to a reduction
in the number of R&D projects in the consolidated firm.63 Some evidence also
suggests that the consolidated firm produces fewer new patents than the two
separate firms did before the merger.64 However, as acknowledged by the studies
themselves, much of the reduction in R&D expenditures, projects in
development, and number of new patents in the newly-consolidated firm is the
60. DEP’T. OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
10–11
(1995),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf
61. Douglas L. Wald & Deborah L. Feinstein, Merger Enforcement in Innovation Markets: The
Latest
Chapter—Genzyme/Novazyme,
ANTITRUST
SOURCE
2
(July
2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jul04_Feinstein7_23.authchec
kdam.pdf.
62. JUSTUS HAUCAP & JOEL STIEBALE, HOW MERGERS AFFECT INNOVATION: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (Hans-Theo Normann, ed.) Düsseldorf University
Press)
(2016),
http://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/
Discussion_Paper/218_Haucap_Stiebale.pdf (finding that R&D spending declines post-merger); see also
Carmine Ornaghi, Mergers and Innovation in Big Pharma, 27 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 70, 76 (2009) (finding
R&D expenditures decline after a merger); Danzon ET AL., supra note 9, at 322–324 (finding that small
merging firms experienced slower growth in R&D expenditures than non-merging firms, but there was no
difference for large firms).
63. Ravenscraft & Long, supra note 7, at 317 (finding that some mergers resulted in the cancelling,
postponing, or delaying of R&D projects).
64. Haucap & Stiebale, supra note 62, at 21 (finding that patent stocks decline post-merger); Ornaghi,
supra note 62, at 76 (finding that number of new patents and number of new important patents decline
after a merger).
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result of efficiency gains. 65 Mergers enable firms to streamline duplicative
operations, reduce excess capacity, and achieve economies of scale, in turn
reducing the consolidated firms’ expenses and eliminating redundant projects or
patents.66 Additionally, studies comparing the innovation activities in newlymerged firms with the activities in non-merging firms likely suffer from selection
bias; firms under economic stress are more likely to merge, so a comparison of
merging with non-merging firms is capturing differences between firms with
different economic prospects.67
To escape these confounding influences and selection effects, a recent study
has examined the impact of consolidation on innovation activities outside the
firm on the theory that a reduction in competition following a merger would
reduce competitors’ incentives to innovate. 68 The study found that mergers
reduce R&D spending and the number of patents in both the merging firm and
in rival firms. However, as I explain in the next section, all firms (including
consolidated firms and rivals) have experienced a general decrease in internal
R&D activities as they adjust to the new economic reality of the pharmaceutical
industry that makes external sourcing of R&D more attractive than internal
development. Moreover, consolidation of a rival may compel firms to substitute
away from internal R&D even more than the general trend would suggest.
Because consolidation typically improves efficiency in the consolidated firm,
rival firms may begin to outsource more of their R&D, with a corresponding
decrease in their in-house innovation, in an effort to compete with the more
efficient consolidated firm.
In addition to the academic research on the impact of M&A on innovation,
regulatory agencies have also raised concerns about consolidation’s impact on
innovation markets. Merger challenges based on the impact of consolidation on
innovation are relatively new; the competition agencies did not challenge a
merger on the ground that it would harm innovation until the mid-1970s, 69 and
it wasn’t until the 1990s that FTC and DOJ began to routinely question the
impact of mergers on innovation. During this period, the agencies often required
the divestiture or compulsory licensing of intellectual property to approve
mergers, especially in pharmaceutical mergers.70

65. Ravenscraft & Long, supra note 7, at 313, 317.
66. Grabowski, supra note 6, at 173; Ravenscraft & Long, supra note 7, at 317.
67. Danzon ET AL., supra note 9, at 325–326.
68. SEE HAUCAP & STIEBALE, supra note 62, at 21 (finding that patent stocks in newly merged
entities decline an average of thirty percent immediately post-merger).
69. See Complaint at 364, 368, In the Matter of Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (Fed. Trade Comm’n
July 20, 1975) (No. 8909) (claiming that Xerox maintained patent barriers and harmed innovation through
mergers)
70. See, e.g., Baxter Int’l, 123 F.T.C. 904, 910–911, (1997) (in the merger of Baxter International
and Immuno-International, two of the leading commercial developers of the Factor VIII inhibitor
treatments used to treat antibodies in hemophilia, FTC required Baxter to divest certain treatment assets);
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The agencies’ innovation harm claims essentially ceased during the George
W. Bush Administration in the 2000s.71 While the FTC and DOJ pressed
innovations concerns in their challenges to 51 mergers during the 1990s,72 they
pursued an innovation harm claim in only one case between 2004–2008.73
Timothy Muris, FTC Chairman from 2001-2004, explained that the agencies’
reluctance to cite innovation harms arose from an uncertainty about the
relationship between concentration and innovation: “there is no reason to
believe, a priori, that a particular merger is more likely to harm innovation than
to help it—which is, of course, simply another way of saying that there is no
empirical basis for a presumption.” 74 Critics of merger enforcement in
innovation markets maintained that, instead of reducing innovation, market
concentration could increase innovation because market power gave firms both
the resources to invest in R&D and the ability to think long-term instead of
worrying about short-term responses to rivals. Indeed, during this time, even the
Supreme Court noted that market power could increase innovation because the
ability to charge monopoly prices “induces risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth.” 75
However, regulatory agencies have recently expressed a renewed interest
in examining the impacts of mergers on innovation. In 2015, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) opposed the proposed merger of Applied Materials and Tokyo
Electron “to protect competition and future innovation for the development of
machinery used to make the memory and logic chips that power smartphones,
tablets, computers, and many other products.” 76 That same year, DOJ opposed
the proposed merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable, even though there was
little direct competition between the parties, because the merger would make

see also, e.g., In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842, 844, 865–67 (1997) (in the merger of
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, the two leading commercial developers of gene therapy products, FTC required
the compulsory licensing of the specified gene therapy technology and patent rights to a competitor that
could compete with the combined firm).
71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST REGULATION OF INNOVATION MARKETS: REMARKS OF J.
THOMAS ROSCH 9 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/antitrustregulation-innovation-markets/090205innovationspeech.pdf.
72. David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Principles,
43 IDEA 395, 424–25 (2003).
73. FED. TRADE COMM’N supra, note 71.
74. See Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme
Corporation/Novazyme Pharmaceuticals 23 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/pressreleases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticalsinc./murisgenzymestmt.pdf.
75. Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Off. Of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (suggesting
that the mere possession of monopoly power is not unlawful because it induces risk taking).
76. Statement of Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, Hearing on ‘Oversight of
the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws’ Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights, Comm. on the Judiciary, at 7 (Mar. 9, 2016) (statement of Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Division)
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“Comcast an unavoidable gatekeeper” for future innovative internet services.77
Further, although the proposed merger between Halliburton and Baker Hughes
did involve competitive overlap of products and services, DOJ tried to block the
merger in 2016 in part because the two companies “drive innovation in these
markets, often leading the way in developing next-generation technology to
solve the most challenging problems facing the oil and gas industry.”78
The European Commission has similarly raised innovation concerns in its
analyses of several recent mergers. In 2015, the Commission argued that the
merger of Biomet and Zimmer Holdings, two orthopedic implant producers for
knees and elbows in the U.S., would have led to “less innovation and choice”.79
That same year, the Commission granted the acquisition of GlaxoSmithKline’s
oncology business by Novartis conditional on the divestment of two cancer
treatments after concluding that, without divestment, the acquisition may have
“reduced innovation, with the likely abandonment of Novartis’ broad clinical
trial program.”80 Similarly, in 2016, the Commission granted the acquisition of
mobile network operator BASE by Liberty Global subject to certain divestment
requirements because of concerns that the acquisition would otherwise result in
“less choice and innovation” for mobile consumers. 81
Several mergers face scrutiny for potential innovation harms in both the
U.S. and Europe. Although most contested deals are not based exclusively on
innovation markets, claims of innovation harm are increasing and often result in
the required divestiture of innovation-related assets. In the agricultural industry,
opponents to the proposed merger of Monsanto and Bayer argue that
consolidation will slow innovation in crop biotechnology and the development
of new seed traits,82 with U.S. lawmakers asserting that the consolidated seed

77. Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition of Time Warner Cable After Justice
Department and the Federal Communications Commission Informed Parties of Concerns, DEP’T OF JUST.
(Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporation-abandons-proposed-acquisitiontime-warner-cable-after-justice-department.
78. Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer Delivers Remarks at Press Call Announcing that the Justice
Department Seeks to block Halliburton’s Acquisition of Baker Hughes, DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-remarks-press-callannouncing-justice.
79. European Commission Press Release IP/15/4727, Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of
orthop[e]dic implants producer Biomet by Zimmer, subject to conditions (Mar. 30, 2015)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4727_en.htm.
80. European Commission Press Release IP/15/3842, Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of
GSK’s oncology business by Novartis, subject to conditions (Jan. 28, 2015) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-15-3842_en.htm.
81. European Commission Press Release IP/16/241, Mergers: Commission clears acquisition of
mobile network operator BASE by Liberty Global, subject to conditions (Feb. 4, 2016)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-241_en.htm.
82. David McLaughlin, Bayer, Monsanto Face Global Review as Farmer Options Shrink, Bloomberg
Markets, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0914/bayer-monsanto-confront-global-review-as-farmer-options-shrink.
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and crop-chemical giant would have “reduced incentives and ability to
innovate.”83 Similarly, the European Commission has raised concerns that the
proposed merger between Dow and Dupont, which would create the world’s
largest integrated crop protection and seeds company, “may lead to a reduction
of innovation in crop protection as a whole.”84 U.S. lawmakers have also raised
concerns that the Dow-Dupont merger “will reduce incentives to invest in
research and development.”85
Commentators have expressed concern that the increased scrutiny of
innovation markets in the agricultural industry may soon bleed over into the
pharmaceutical industry. However, as I discuss in the following section, the
innovation ecosystem in the pharmaceutical industry has changed dramatically,
making many inquiries of consolidation’s impact on innovation immaterial.
Analyses of the impacts of consolidation on innovation must take into account
the new reality that most innovation does not occur internally, and consolidation
may enable firms to increase both their support of and demand for externallysourced innovation.
II.

THE CURRENT DRUG INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM

Since the advent of modern biotech in the 1970s with the formation of
Genentech,86 biotech companies have played an increasingly important role in
the pharmaceutical industry. Today, about two-thirds of New Molecular Entities
(“NMEs”) approved by the FDA originate in biotech and small pharmaceutical
companies,87 and these companies account for almost 70 percent of the current
global pipeline of drugs under development.88 Moreover, traditional
pharmaceutical companies routinely look to biotech companies as critical
external sources of R&D. Indeed, 74 percent of new drugs are originally

83. Press Release, Senator Mike Lee, Lee, Klobuchar React to Proposed Bayer-Monsanto Merger
(Sept. 14 2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=E0254B06-5138-474BA981- 36659807DCE4.
84. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2784, Mergers: Commission opens in-depth
investigation into proposed merger between Dow and DuPont (Aug. 11, 2016)
http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_IP-16-2784_en.htm.
85. Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Seed and Agrochemical Industry, Before the Judiciary
Comm.,(Sept. 20, 2016) (statement of Mike Lee, Senator for Utah).
86. See generally, SALLY SMITH HUGHES, GENETECH: THE BEGINNINGS OF BIOTECH (2011).
87. ULRICH GEILINGER ET AL., TRENDS IN US NEW DRUG APPROVALS 12 (2016),
http://www.hbmpartners.com/wAssets/docs/industry- reports/HBM-Report-Trends-in-US-New-DrugApprovals-2006-2015.pdf.
88. DAVID THOMAS & CHAD WESSEL, EMERGING THERAPEUTIC COMPANY INVESTMENT AND DEAL
TRENDS 30 (June 2016).
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developed externally, and later obtained by a pharmaceutical company through
a merger, acquisition, licensing deal, or other alliance.89
In the pharmaceutical industry, biotech companies are generally smaller
companies that are primarily focused on research and development to identify
molecules to be used in new drug products.90 Whereas pharmaceutical
companies have typically focused on the development of traditional chemicallysynthesized drugs, biotech companies are usually focused on applying
biotechnology to produce drugs from living cells.91 After the identification of
promising molecules, biotech companies often license or sell the rights to the
future drug, or form some other sort of partnership with a traditional
pharmaceutical company that markets and distributes the drug.92 These
traditional pharmaceutical companies are generally larger than biotech
companies and, though also involved in research and development, devote
significant efforts to the clinical testing, marketing, manufacturing, and
distribution of drugs.93
A. The Evolution of Pharmaceutical Innovation
Several forces in the 1970s and 1980s combined to bring about the rapid
growth in the biotech industry. First, revolutionary breakthroughs that took place
in universities in the 1970s, such as gene splicing and the ability to create
antibodies that specifically target certain antigens, elevated the importance of
industry-university connections and accelerated the pace of discovery in
biomedical sciences.94 Second, changes in financial regulations and tax law led

89. MURRAY AITKEN & MICHAEL KLEINROCK, LIFETIME TRENDS IN BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION
4
(Jan.
2017)
https://www.statnews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Lifetime_Trends_in_Biopharmaceutical_Innovation.pdf.
90. Mark Terry, Biotech vs. Big Pharma: Which is the Better Place to work?, BIOSPACE (Sept. 9,
2016), http://www.biospace.com/News/biotech-vs-big-pharma-which-is-the-better-place-to/432908.
91. Michelle Ahern, The Difference Between Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology, MORGAN
MCKINLEY (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.morganmckinley.ie/article/difference-between-pharmaceuticaland-biotechnology.
92. See Ulrich Geilinger ET AL., Trends in US New Drug Approvals, 12 (2016)
http://www.hbmpartners.com/wAssets/docs/industry-reports/HBM-Report-Trends-in-US-New- DrugApprovals-2006-2015.pdf, (demonstrating how the “majority of new drug approved by FDA in 2015 (and
the years before) originated at smaller companies (i.e. companies outside of the largest 30 biopharma
companies). As these smaller companies often out- license their drug candidates or get acquired before
approval, the number of approvals in their name (16 in 2015) understates their important contribution to
the development of new drugs…”).
93. Id. at 11 providing that large pharmaceutical companies developing drugs purchased through
company acquisition, continue to develop drugs in-house.); see generally, Richard Anderson,
Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC (Nov. 6, 2014)(summarizing data gathered by
GlobalData,a large data collection and analysis firm, which demonstrates that big pharma’s spending on
sales and marketing greatly outweighs money spent on R&D).
94. Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure Of The Pharmaceutical Industry, 23 HEALTH AFF.,
10, 15 (2004).
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to a boom in venture capital (“VC”) funds, which are the primary financiers of
biotech companies. In 1979, the Department of Labor determined that pension
funds could invest in VC funds; today pension funds are responsible for over
50% of the investment in VC funds.95 Two years later, the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 lowered the individual capital gains tax rate from 42% to 20%,
incentivizing individual investment in VC funds.96 As a result of these changes,
VC funds more than doubled in the 3 years between 1979 and 1982. 97 Third, in
1980, issuance of the Cohen-Boyer patents covering recombinant DNA cloning
opened the door for the patentability of discoveries in molecular biology. 98
Because early biotech companies generally had scientific ideas rather than
tangible products, patents covering their discoveries were critical to instill
confidence in investors that a proprietary concept could be commercialized
before it was appropriated by someone else or developed elsewhere. Finally, the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, for the first time, enabled non-government entities to
patent discoveries emerging from federally-funded research.99 These new patent
rights encouraged biotech companies to collaborate with federally-funded
research programs in government or academia and to invest the necessary time
and money to develop and commercialize products.100
More recently, new technologies have lowered some of the costs of early
stage drug discovery. Computer-assisted drug design uses computer algorithms
to identify the most promising molecules for new drugs, enabling much of the
trial-and-error of early drug design to take place on computers instead of in the
lab. 101 Similarly, innovation in genome-sequencing technologies has greatly
reduced the cost of sequencing DNA to identify genetic mutations that can lead
to new drugs.102 These and other novel technologies enable early-stage drug

95. Douglas P. Lee & Mark D. Dibner, The Rise of Venture Capital and Biotechnology in the US and
Europe, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 672, 673 (2005).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of DNA, 92 ISIS 541, 572 (2001) (describing how
“[t]he encouragement and reassurance that the Cohen-Boyer patent and, to a lesser extent, other early
patents in biotechnology contributed was significant in the formative stage of a commercial field in which
proprietary rights to scientific processes and products were central and critical.”).
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1980)(“Each nonprofit organization or small business firm may, within a
reasonable time after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to any
subject invention.”).
100. Wendy H. Schacht, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and The
Commercialization of Technology, CONG. RES. SERV., 8–9 (2012)(referencing studies that attribute to the
Bayh-Dole Act increased collaboration between biotech companies and government entities and
commercialization of federally funded research).
101. Petra Schneider & Gisbert Schneider, De Novo Design at the Edge of Chaos, 59 J. MED.
CHEMISTRY 4077, 4079 (2016).
102. See Julie Steenhuysen, How DNA Sequencing is Transforming the Hunt for New Drugs, REUTERS
(May
13,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-precisionmedicine-insightidUSKBN0NY0AX20150513
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design to occur at much lower cost, eliminating the advantage that large,
resource-rich companies had over smaller biotechs at the preliminary stages of
drug discovery.103
Since the 1980s, the biotech industry has evolved to play a critical role in
the pharmaceutical industry. The worldwide sales of biotech drugs have reached
nearly $300 billion, accounting for over 20 percent of worldwide drug sales.104
Venture capital investment has risen correspondingly to fund the biotech
industry. Whereas annual VC funding in the biotech sector rarely exceeded $1
billion in the 1980s and early 1990s, VC funding increased by 842% between
1991 and 2001.105 Between 2004 and 2008, VC firms invested $21.5 billion in
biotech drug R&D.106 VC funding hit an all-time high in 2015,107 with over $7.5
billion raised for biotech companies in the pharmaceutical industry.108
At the same time that the biotech industry boomed, traditional
pharmaceutical companies have experienced a decrease in their internal R&D
productivity. Money spent on internal R&D at large pharmaceutical companies
is not producing the same returns it once did. Both the number of new patents

(providing that Regeneron Pharmaceuticals executives indicated that “they have used data from the first
35,000 volunteers to confirm the promise of 250 genes on a list of targets for drugs aimed at common
medical conditions, including high levels of cholesterol and triglycerides.”).
103. See generally, Peter Gwynne & Gary Heebner, Drug Discovery and Biotechnology Trends:
Recent Developments in Drug Discovery: Improvements in Efficiency, AM. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT SCI.,
(2017) http://www.sciencemag.org/site/products/ddbt_0207_Final.xhtml (generally discussing newer
technologies, such as high throughput screening systems, rational drug design, combinatorial chemistry,
searchable chemical databases, and use of electronic laboratory notebooks that may help to reduce drug
design costs in the biotech market).
104. DELOITTE,
2016
GLOBAL
LIFE
SCIENCES
OUTLOOK,
3
(2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Life-Sciences-Health-Care/gx-lshc2016-life-sciences-outlook.pdf.
105. LENA ANDREWS & JERRY PAYTAS, BIORISING: VENTURE FIRMS REDISCOVER BIOTECH 1,
(Carnegie Mellon University)(2002).
106. Sy Mukherjee, How VC Funding for Biotech has Fundamentally Changed—and What it Means
for the Industry, BIOPHARMA DIVE (June 3, 2015), http://www.biopharmadive.com/news/how-vcfunding-for-biotech-has-fundamentally-changedand-what-it-means-for/399988/
107. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, LIFE SCIENCES INVESTMENTS DEPART FROM YEAR-LONG HIGH, 4
(2016),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/assets/pwc-life-sciences-venturefunding-trends-2015-q4.pdf.
108. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, BIOTECH HITS RECORD FIRST QUARTER HIGH, 2 (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health- industries/publications/assets/pwc-biotech-trending-high-q1-2015.pdf
(VC investment for the biotech life sciences sector was $1.7 billion in the first quarter of 2015); see also,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, LIFE SCIENCES FUNDING REACHES RECORD HIGH, 2 (2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/assets/pwc-moneytree-life-sciences- fundingreaches-q2-2015.pdf ($2.3 billion in the second quarter); see also, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, BIOTECH
HOLDS STRONG AMID RECORD HIGH INVESTMENTS 2 (2015), http://pwchealth.com/cgilocal/hregister.cgi/reg/pwc-life- sciences-money-tree-q3-2015.pdf ($2.1 billion in the third quarter); see
also, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, LIFE SCIENCES INVESTMENTS DEPART FROM YEAR-LONG HIGH, 2
(2016),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/assets/pwc-life-sciences-venturefunding-trends-2015-q4.pdf ($1.5 billion in the fourth quarter).
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per R&D dollar spent109 and the revenue from new drugs per R&D dollar spent110
have declined steadily over the last decade as a result of a general increase in
R&D spending paired with a leveling off of FDA approvals and a decrease in
new drug sales. R&D spending has increased by approximately 145% since the
early 2000s, from an estimated $1.04 billion to $2.6 billion to develop and bring
each new drug to market.111
The number of regulatory requirements imposed by the FDA has increased
by 15 percent since the early 2000s.112 The average number of patients required
for clinical trials have increased,113 the costs of recruiting patients has increased,
the clinical trial period has lengthened, and the number and complexity of clinical
tests used in clinical trials have increased.114 The more stringent requirements,
along with the more complex science associated with specialized medications,
have significantly increased the costs of drug development and FDA approval.
Meanwhile, the returns from R&D have not increased to offset the
increasing R&D costs. Although drug approval rates vary year-by-year, there has
been no consistent increase in FDA approvals in recent decades. 115 Moreover,
109. See Jack W. Scannel ET AL., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NAT.
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY, 191, 192 (Mar. 2012) (demonstrating how the number of new drugs approved by
the FDA per billion US dollars spent on research and development has halved roughly every 9 years).
110. See Measuring the Return From Pharmaceutical Innovation: Balancing the R&D Equation,
(2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-andDELOITTE
healthcare/articles/measuring-return-from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html
[hereinafter
DELOITTE,
Pharmaceutical Innovation].(demonstrating how returns from R&D continues to drop, with a projected
drop of 3.7% in 2015)
111. See Joseph A. DiMasi ET AL., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 28 (2016) (demonstrating that “The base result is total cost per approved
new compound for the DiMasi et al. (2003) study in year 2013 dollars ($1044 million). The current study
full cost estimate is 145% higher than the base result.”); see also Joseph A. DiMasi ET AL., The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (providing
that…”[o]ur full cost estimate is the sum of our preclinical and clinical period cost estimates. Our base
case out-of-pocket cost per approved new drug is US$ 403 million, while our fully capitalized total cost
estimate is US$ 802 million.”)
112. Alexander Gaffney, It’s Not Just You: FDA Regulatory Requirements Really Are Increasing,
RAPS (Oct. 30 2014), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/10/30/20656/Its-Not-JustYou-FDA-Regulatory-Requirements-Really-Are-Increasing/
113. Grabowski, supra note 6, at 169.
114. Id.; See generally Kenneth A. ET. AL, Variability in Protocol Design Complexity by Phase and
Therapeutic Area, 45 DRUG INFORM J., 413 (Jan. 2011) (discussing how the authors of 2008 study had
found that “higher levels of protocol complexity were associated with longer clinical trial cycle times,
higher levels of work effort to administer protocol procedures, and lower study volunteer randomization
and enrollment rates.”).
115. See
PHRMA,
ANNUAL
MEMBERSHIP
SURVEY
(2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015-phrma_profile_membership_results.pdf
(demonstrating how Industry R&D spending is shown in 2014 dollars and is based on members of the
PhRMA trade association.); see also Summary of NDA Approvals & Receipts, 1938 to the Present (last
updated
Jan.
18,
2013),
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/summaryofndaapprovalsreceipts193
8tothepresent/default.htm (demonstrating how New Drug Approvals show the approvals of new molecular
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revenues from new drug sales have steadily declined;116 the average lifetime
revenue for new drugs is lower now than at any point in the last 25 years.117 Thus,
stagnating or falling returns combined with increasing R&D costs have led to a
steady decline in internal R&D productivity.
B. The Relative Strengths of Biotech and Traditional Pharmaceutical
Companies
Biotech companies generally differ from traditional pharmaceutical
companies in a few critical areas that give these companies a comparative
advantage in early-stage drug development. First, operating at a smaller size
gives biotech companies important flexibility. Smaller companies generally have
a less bureaucratic organization structure that allows for nimbler decisionmaking.118 With only a small group of key decision-makers, smaller companies
can stay sharply focused on the company’s strategic goals and make quick
decisions to fund promising projects or kill unsuccessful projects at an early
stage.119 In contrast, in larger companies with highly bureaucratic structures and
multiple divisions, decision-making takes substantially longer and the optimal
decision may sometimes succumb to office politics and competing conflicts of
interest.120
Second, biotech companies tend to have more geographic and personal
links to nonprofit research institutions, such as research institutes and
universities. In these institutions, academic scientists research questions and
concepts in basic biomedical science without concern for the commercialization
of any discoveries they make.121 In fact, the first biotech companies emerged as
a result of revolutionary breakthroughs in basic science that took place in

entities, including both chemicals and biologics. Data on new drug approvals from 1980-2011); see also
FDA,
NOVEL
DRUGS
2015
SUMMARY
5
(Jan.
2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/UCM481709.pdf
(finding that there has been very little consistent growth in the past decade).
116. DELOITTE, Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 110.
117. PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSP., supra note 33, at 44.
118. Grabowski, supra note 6, at 165.
119. Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 107; see generally Michael Mazzeo ET AL., What Small
Businesses
Do
Better
Than
Corporate
America,
FORTUNE
(Jun.
10,
2014)
http://fortune.com/2014/06/10/what-small-businesses-do-better-than-corporate-america/ (comparing the
efficiencies of small businesses to their large corporate counterparts).
120. Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 107 (illuminating how aligning “end-to-end decision
making across the organization” and striking “the right balance of staff and resource” increases R&D
productivity and commercial success); see also Mazzeo, supra note 116 (explaining that smaller
companies can exploit the “bureaucracy, corporate politics, and internal rivalries” that are present in big
firms).
121. See Cockburn, supra note 94 at 15 (2004) (noting that “establishing priority and reputation drove
early and extensive publication of results, and social norms (and requirements of granting agencies)
promoted routine sharing of research materials” rather than commercialization).
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universities in the 1970s.122 Many biotech companies continue to have academic
scientists as their founders or chief scientific officers and are located near
universities to encourage collaboration with researchers that remain in
academia.123 As the pace of discovery in basic biomedical science has
accelerated with the mapping of the human genome and advances in
bioinformatics, close contact between biotech companies and academic science
has remained critical to the drug development process.124
Third, in contrast to traditional pharmaceutical companies that generally
finance their R&D spending from current revenues, biotech companies are
typically funded by venture capital and private equity investments. In 2015,
venture capitalists invested almost $7 billion in biotech deals125 and, with the
exception of a few cyclical declines during economic downturns; VC investment
in biotech has steadily increased since the early 1990s.126 Venture capital
funding enables biotech companies to take more risk on drug development
projects than traditional pharmaceutical companies that are generally risking
their own resources. In addition, the pressure of external funding with strict
oversight by outside investment managers, pressure to meet timelines for each
stage of development, and staged funding based on achieved milestones gives
biotech companies a limited timeframe to demonstrate the value of projects,
contributing to the culture of nimble decision-making; promising projects are
accelerated while lagging projects are terminated quickly. 127
Finally, biotech’s keen focus on strategic objectives, culture of creativity
and innovation, and greater risk tolerance attracts the best scientists, many of
whom leave traditional pharmaceutical companies for smaller biotech
companies.128 In biotech, the scientists generally avoid the administrative
burdens and red tape that plague large pharma companies that are the enemy of
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 15.
Grabowski, supra note 6 at 165.
Id.
DAVID THOMAS & CHAD WESSEL, EMERGING THERAPEUTIC COMPANY INVESTMENT AND DEAL
TRENDS: US VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS, 2006-2015 CURRENT PIPELINE FOR EMERGING
COMPANIES 3(2016).
126. Douglas Lee & Mark Dibner, The Rise of Venture Capital and Biotechnology in the US and
Europe, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 672, 673 (2005).
127. DELOITTE CENTRE FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, BALANCING THE R&D EQUATION: MEASURING
THE RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 30 (2016),
128. See generally Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups/ (reporting that more top executives
are leaving large pharmaceutical companies for biotech startups); See Erika Check Hayden, Young
Scientists
Ditch
Postdocs
for
Biotech
Start-ups,
NATURE
(Nov.
1,
2016),
http://www.nature.com/news/young-scientists-ditch-postdocs-for-biotech-start-ups-1.20912#auth-1
(reporting that many young biomedical scientists are starting their own companies rather than taking a
more traditional path); Jonathan Rockoff, Big Pharma, Short on Blockbusters, Outsources the Science,
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-pharma-short-on-blockbustersoutsources-the-science-1481042583.
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innovation.129 Instead, the scientists are involved on a daily basis with discovery
and innovation, the reasons they originally entered the field. The greater risk
tolerance of biotech companies allows scientists to pursue projects they might
not be able to pursue in a more risk-averse pharmaceutical company. Moreover,
smaller biotech companies often include stock options in compensation
packages, giving scientists a big reward when projects prove successful.130 As
research scientists have steadily moved into biotech, the innovation has
followed; biotech companies now account for approximately two-thirds of
NMEs approved by the FDA131 and 70% of drugs currently in the pipeline.132
Just as biotech companies have a comparative advantage in early-stage
development, large pharmaceutical companies have advantages in the more
advanced stages of development and in the production, marketing, and
distribution of drugs. The large pharmaceutical companies’ significant cash
reserves allow them to provide funding for expensive clinical trials in the late
stages of drug development.133 These companies also generally have
considerable experience in both large-scale clinical trial design and in
coordination of various regulatory requirements. 134They can provide the
operational scale in manufacturing, existing distribution networks, and colossal
sales forces necessary to achieve rapid uptake of new products.135 And they have
learned to maneuver through the red tape of the commercialization process,
including regulations on drug promotion, patent exclusivity, payer negotiations,
taxes, and much more.136
The industry has responded to the relative strengths of biotech versus
traditional pharma by fostering an innovation ecosystem where larger
pharmaceutical companies increasingly look externally for R&D. 137
129. Tom Hughes, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Big Pharma Execs taking the Biotech Plunge, LIFE
SCI. VC (Oct. 6, 2014), https://lifescivc.com/2014/10/should-i-stay-or-should-i-go-big-pharma-execstaking-the-biotech-plunge/.
130. Mark Terry, Biotech vs. Big Pharma: Which is the Better Place to Work? BIOSPACE (Sept. 19,
2016),
http://www.biospace.com/News/biotech-vs-big-pharma-which-is-the-better-place-to/432908
(comparing and contrasting biotech companies and pharmaceutical companies and explaining that stock
options are attractive aspects of biotech startups, but should be kept in perspective).
131. See Ulrich Geilinger et. al., Trends in US New Drug Approvals, (Feb. 2016),
http://www.hbmpartners.com/wAssets/docs/industry-reports/HBM-Report-Trends-in-US-New-DrugApprovals-2006-2015.pdf (indicating two thirds of NMEs approved by the FDA are now accounted for
by biotechs, signaling a move by research scientists into biotech).
132. THOMAS & WESSEL, supra note 86, at 30.
133. Wendy Tsai & Stanford Erickson, Early-Stage Biotech Companies: Strategies for Survival and
Growth, 3 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, 49, 50–52 (2006).
134. Grabowski, supra note 6 at 173.
135. Tsai & Erickson, supra note 133, at 50–52.
136. Nicole Fisher & Scott Liebman, Are M&A replacing R&D in Pharma, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2015/04/22/are-ma-replacing-rd-in-pharma/#754cc4d6cb57.
137. See Lisa LaMotta, How Incubators are Accelerating Early Drug Development, B IO P HARMA
DIVE (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.biopharmadive.com/news/incubators-biotechs-early-drug-
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Increasingly, innovation originates in biotech companies, where the culture, risk
tolerance, and strategic goals encourage early-stage development. To complete
the development process and commercialize their drugs, biotech companies
regularly collaborate with large pharmaceutical companies that push drugs
through the grueling late-stage clinical trials and regulatory hurdles of the FDA,
organize their manufacturing and distribution capabilities to bring the drug to
market, and mobilize their vast sales force to quickly achieve peak sales. By
concentrating on their comparative advantages, both biotech and large pharma
companies improve on their strengths without being hindered by their
weaknesses.
Whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s, almost all drug discoveries took
place inside traditional pharmaceutical companies,138 today pharmaceutical
companies increasingly look to collaborations with biotech companies and other
external entities.139 These collaborations often take the form of licensing deals,
co-development alliances to share costs and risks, equity-based joint ventures,
and mergers and acquisitions.140 As a result, the share of internally-developed
versus externally-developed drugs has changed dramatically as traditional
pharmaceutical companies have shifted resources away from internal R&D
expenditures and projects and towards external sources of innovation.141
Externally-sourced drugs now account for an incredible 74 percent of new drugs
registered with the FDA for sale in the U.S.142 However, traditional
pharmaceutical companies remain active in the innovation process through
collaborations; 60-70 percent of large pharmaceutical companies’ drug approvals
are the result of licensing deals and mergers or acquisitions.143 Moreover, for
some large pharmaceutical companies that appreciate the role of alliances in

development/429614/. Recognizing biotech’s advantage in early-stage innovation, large pharmaceutical
companies have recently formed divisions aimed at replicating the biotech culture. Pharmaceutical giants
such as Pfizer, Bayer, and Johnson & Johnson have funded “incubators” that give academic scientists and
biotech entrepreneurs valuable space, equipment, resources, and connections to reproduce the biotech
environment. In return, the pharmaceutical companies are given some level access to the early-stage
innovation developed in the incubators. Id.
138. See Grabowski, supra note 6, at 165 (stating in the 1970s and early 1980s almost all drug
discovery took place within traditional pharmaceutical companies).
139. See Serge Mignani ET AL., Why and How Have Drug Discovery Strategies in Pharma Changed?
What are the New Mindsets?, 21 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 239, 242 (2016) (reporting that “half of all
drugs are developed through collaborations”).
140. Id.
141. John LaMattina, There’s Value in Studying Big Pharma Pipelines, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2013, 8:41
AM) (“Pfizer has been out-licensing a number of early development compounds as it has slashed its R&D
budget. As a result, its pipeline which contained 114 compounds in February, 2011 now has the
aforementioned 78.”).
142. QUINTILES IMS INSTITUTE, LIFETIME TRENDS, supra note, at 12.
143. MURRAY AITKEN & MICHAEL KLEINROCK, LIFETIME TRENDS IN BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION: RECENT EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.statnews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Lifetime_Trends_in_Biopharmaceutical_Innovation.pdf.
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expanding their innovation pipelines, this percentage is even higher. For
example, in 2016, 92 percent of Allergan’s top-25 drugs were externally
sourced.144
That pharmaceutical companies have turned to external sources for a
significant share of their innovative products is no surprise given the strengths
and weaknesses of biotech companies and traditional pharmaceutical companies.
Indeed, research finds benefits to innovation when biotech firms and large
pharma companies specialize based on their comparative advantages. Drug
products developed in alliances have a higher probability of success in late-stage
clinical trials relative to drugs developed by the originator firm,145 regardless of
whether the originator firm is small or large.146This is especially true when the
licensing firm has more experience than the drug originator, as is generally the
case with alliances between smaller biotech companies and larger
pharmaceutical companies. 147 In fact, when measured from the original FDA
application to final approval, externally-sourced drugs have almost double the
success rate as internally-developed drugs.148 Mergers too, as distinct from
alliances, increase the success of drug products in clinical trials; projects initiated
after a merger are much more likely to advance from each stage of
development.149
Moreover, alliances and mergers can have longer-term impacts on
innovation. Evidence shows that R&D alliances help biotech firms establish a
position within a network of firms, which in turn leads to increases in patents and
sales revenue.150 Further, when pharmaceutical companies acquire smaller
biotech companies, the post-merger product pipelines generally improve,
creating longer-term advances in innovation. 151

144. ALLERGAN, OPEN SCIENCE TAKEAWAYS: INTERNAL ANALYSIS (2016).
145. Patricia M. Danzon ET AL., Productivity in Pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D: The Role of
Experience
and
Alliances,
24
J. HEALTH ECON. 317,
337–38
(Jan.
2005),
http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/pcosme/Artigos/49-JHE.pdf; See Sean Nicholson ET AL., Biotechpharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset and Firm Quality, 78 J. BUS. 1433, 1434 (2005),
https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/biotech-pharmaceutical-alliances_1.pdf
(describing a number of strategies and the economics of joint ventures).
146. Danzon et al., supra note 145.
147. Danzon et al., supra note 9, at 321–38.
148. Bruce Booth, Positive Impact of External Sourcing on R&D Productivity, FORBES (Dec. 16,
2016, 7:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebooth/2016/12/16/positive-impact-of-externalsourcing-on-pharma-rd-productivity/amp/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
149. Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 8, at 283.
150. Walter W. Powell et al., Network Position and Firm Performance: Organizational Returns to
Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, in NETWORKS IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS 1, 24–26
(Steven Andrews & David Knoke, eds., 1999), https://web.stanford.edu/~woodyp/papers/Rso1.pdf.
151. See Higgins & Rodriguez, supra note 9 at 352.
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III. THE PROPER ANALYSIS OF CONSOLIDATION’S IMPACT ON INNOVATION
Despite concerns among some researchers and competition agencies that
consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry reduces innovation, aggregate
innovation has held strong notwithstanding dramatic increases in M&A activity.
The years 2014 and 2015 generated both record numbers of new drug approvals
and record pharmaceutical M&A.152 In fact, although M&A deals and new drug
approvals vary slightly year-to-year, the general pattern has been increasing
aggregate innovation alongside increasing consolidation.153
Although trend data is not enough to prove a causal relationship between
innovation and consolidation, when considered alongside the evolving
innovation ecosystem, it suggests that M&A does not stifle drug innovation.
Today, most drug innovation originates outside of traditional pharmaceutical
companies, in biotech companies and smaller firms, where a culture of nimble
decision-making and risk-taking facilitates discovery and innovation. In the later
stages of the drug development process, the biotech companies routinely partner
with large pharmaceutical companies to advance through late-stage clinical trials
and produce, market, and distribute the drugs. 154 In this current ecosystem,
biotech and pharmaceutical firms are able to specialize in what they do best,
bringing expertise and efficiencies to the innovation process. The specialization
has led to an environment in which approximately three-fourths of new drugs are
externally-sourced. 155 Internal R&D is no longer the primary source, or even an
important source, of drug innovation.
As a result, analyses that focus on mergers’ impacts on internal R&D and
innovation are largely missing the point. In the current innovation ecosystem,
where little drug innovation originates internally, a merger’s impact on internal
R&D expenditures or development projects is oftentimes immaterial to
aggregate drug innovation. Although concerns about the effect of consolidation
on internal innovation were well-founded a few decades ago, and may still be
relevant in certain situations, they are, for the most part, misplaced today.
Instead, researchers and enforcement agencies concerned with impacts on
innovation should focus on whether consolidation enables firms to better support
drug innovation in the current ecosystem. Many mergers are aimed at reducing

152. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NOVEL DRUGS SUMMARY 2016 2, 3 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/UCM536693.pdf
(showing that in 2014, 41 drugs were approved, and in 2015, 45 drugs were approved); see also
MERGERMARKET, PHARMA, MEDICAL, & BIOTECH TREND REPORT: Q1-Q4 2016 2 (2017),
http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/MergermarketTrendReport.Q1Q42016.Pharma,Medical,Biotech.pdf
(showing that in 2014, there were 442 mergers worth $260.9 billion, and in 2015, there were 506 mergers
worth $161.7 billion).
153. See MERGERMARKET, supra note 3, at 2.
154. See Mignani ET AL., supra note 139, at 242.
155. See AITKEN & KLEINROCK, supra note 89, at 1.
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costs and increasing efficiencies in the consolidated firms.156 If firms realize
these gains, they should be in a better position to support external innovation. In
the consolidated firms, increases in efficiency and streamlining of operations will
free up money and resources to source external innovation. To improve their
future revenue streams and market share, consolidated firms should use at least
some of the extra resources to acquire external innovation. This increase in
demand for externally-sourced innovation will, in turn, increase the prices paid
for external assets. Indeed, mirroring the increase in demand for external
innovation, both acquisition prices and payments to license R&D-stage assets
from biotech and emerging companies have increased.157 Increasing prices for
R&D stage assets incentivize more early-stage innovation in small firms and
biotech companies, increasing aggregate innovation in the process.
Thus, proper analyses of the impacts of consolidation on innovation must
take into account the current innovation ecosystem in which most innovation
originates externally. Concerns about harms to innovation could be relevant in
specific mergers or acquisitions if the consolidating firms are the primary
innovators in the area, the firm innovate internally, and there are essentially no
sources of external innovation. However, such scenarios are increasingly rare in
the current ecosystem. As long as there is sufficient market competition so that
firms must innovate to ensure their future profitability and market share,
consolidation will often allow firms to devote more resources to externallysourced innovation. The increased demand for externally-sourced innovation
will, in turn, spur incentives to innovate in biotech and small companies.
Therefore, merger analyses should be less concerned with the impact
consolidation will have on internal innovation, and more focused on whether
consolidation will increase demand for externally-sourced innovation and,
ultimately, increase aggregate drug innovation.
CONCLUSION
The pharmaceutical industry has undergone a significant transformation in
recent decades. The intensifying competition from generics, expanding power of
pharmaceutical payers, increasing costs of drug development, and growing risks
of commercial failure have dramatically changed the industry’s economic
environment and strained the finances of traditional pharmaceutical firms. Many
firms have responded by consolidating to either reduce costs or create new
sources of revenue.
As pharmaceutical M&A has soared, so too has concern over the impacts
of consolidation on the industry. While most of the scrutiny has focused on harms

156. See Grabowski, supra note 6 at 173 (noting that pharmaceutical industry mergers boosted
short-term earnings).
157. See DAVID THOMAS & CHAD WESSEL, supra note 88 at 30.
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to competition, researchers and agencies have also raised less-traditional
concerns about harms to innovation in the newly-merged firms. However, these
innovation concerns are, for the most part, based on an outdated understanding
of the drug innovation ecosystem. Whereas a few decades ago almost all drug
discovery took place inside traditional pharmaceutical companies, today most
drug innovation is externally-sourced from biotech companies and smaller firms.
Internal R&D is no longer the primary source, or even an important source, of
drug innovation in large pharmaceutical companies. As a result, merger analyses
that focus on the impact of pharmaceutical consolidation on internal innovation
are incomplete because they fail to recognize that consolidation can increase
demand for externally-sourced innovation and, ultimately, strengthen aggregate
drug innovation.
Pharmaceutical industry analysts expect the already heightened pace of
M&A activity to pick up under the Trump administration, as soaring stock prices
and favorable tax reforms boost deal-making.158 Policy makers must understand
the role of consolidation in the current innovation ecosystem and evaluate
mergers for their likely impacts on aggregate drug innovation.
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